PDF AGAINST ALL THINGS ENDING
Against All Things Ending. Home · Against All Things Ending Author: Stephen R. Against All Things Ending. Read more · Against All Things Ending. Against All Things Ending is a fantasy novel by American writer Stephen R. Donaldson. and on 28 October in the United Kingdom. A preview of the book's first chapter is currently available in PDF form from the author's website. Start by marking “Against All Things Ending (The Last Chronicles of Thomas Covenant, #3)” as Want to Read: Stephen Reeder Donaldson is an American fantasy, science fiction, and mystery novelist; in the United Kingdom he is usually called "Stephen Donaldson" (without the "R").
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If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must forever have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding, or disposal of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal.
Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they never had been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then, if the attributes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent, the exercises of them must likewise be excellent.
If it be an excellent thing, that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unless the operation itself were excellent.
A sufficiency for any work is no further valuable, than the work itself is valuable. As God therefore esteems these attributes themselves valuable, and delights in them; so it is natural to suppose that he delights in their proper exercise and expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason, as he delights in his own disposition to do justly, and to dispose of things according to truth and just proportion; so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself.
It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen, by other beings besides himself.
For if they are, it will be just the same, as to the above purpose, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual operations of them, and since.
If, therefore, it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually exhibited in their correspondent effects; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections and discoveries is valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that it is desirable that this knowledge should exist. And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity, is worthy to be regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order what is fittest and best.
If existence is more worthy than defect and non-entity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge is; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz. This knowledge is one of the highest, most real, and substantial parts of all created existence, most remote from non-entity and defect.
There is no more reason to esteem it a suitable thing, that there should be an idea in the understanding corresponding unto the glorious object, than that there should be a corresponding affection in the will. If the perfection itself be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent. And as it is fit that God should love and esteem his own excellence, it is also fit that he should 13 value and esteem the love of his excellency.
And if it becomes a being highly to value himself, it is fit that he should love to have himself valued and esteemed. As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God — a fullness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness — and as this fullness is capable of communication, or emanation ad extra; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams.
And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this in the Divine Being, must be looked upon as an excellent disposition. Such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it. So far as the stream may be looked upon as anything besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good.
And if the fullness of good that is in the fountain, is in itself excellent, then the emanation, which is as it were an increase, repetition, or multiplication of it, is excellent. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding; and, as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence, and beauty, that so it should flow out in communicated holiness.
And that, as there is an infinite fullness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.
For an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fullness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself.
Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse sap and life, is doubtless the reason of their communication to its buds, leaves, and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to diffuse its sap and life in general.
Therefore, to speak strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fullness, was what excited him to create the world; and so, that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation.
Because it is agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself highest; therefore, I would endeavor to show, how his infinite love to and delight in himself, will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things: or rather, how a value to these things is implied in his value of that infinite fullness of good that is in himself.
If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, etc. So if God both esteem and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he cannot but value and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them.
So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in himself; and in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, he makes himself his end. And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain.
For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must from the same disposition be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed, and prized by others. He that loves anything, naturally loves the approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation of it.
Thus it is when one loves the virtues of a friend. And thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies; and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities; that is, it is fit that he should take delight in his own excellencies being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and delighted in.
This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections; and in making this his end, he makes himself his end. And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz. Merely in this disposition to cause an emanation of his glory and fullness — which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be considered as the inciting cause of giving existence to other beings — God cannot so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself.
For the creature is not as yet considered as existing.
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This disposition or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground even of the future, intended, and foreseen existence of the creature. In a larger sense, it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate of his own fullness in general; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness; and to give creatures existence in order to it.
This may be called benevolence, or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love. But yet this cannot have any particular present or future created existence for its object; because it is prior to any such object, and the very source of the futurities of its existence. Love, in the most strict and proper sense, presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future.
God did not love angels in 15 the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them.
Love or benevolence, strictly taken, presupposes and existing object, as much as pity a miserable suffering object. This propensity in God to diffuse himself, may be considered as a propensity to himself diffused; or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it.
Thus, that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates in its own complete self. And so the disposition in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fullness, warmth, and brightness, is only a tendency to its own most glorious and complete state.
So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of his infinite glory, to belong to the fullness and completeness of himself; as though he were not in his most glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ toward whom and in whom are the emanations of his glory, and the communication of his fullness , is called the fullness of Christ; as though he were not in his complete state without her; like Adam without Eve.
And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel MY GLORY — Indeed, after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to them, in the strictest sense, in his dealings with them. Here God acting for himself, or making himself his last end, and his acting for their sake, are not to be set in opposition; they are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other.
One part of that divine fullness which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. God, in making this his end, makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. It is a participation of the same; though infinitely less in degree: as particular beams of the sun communicated are the light and glory of the sun itself, in part.
As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge, he must delight in every thing of that nature: as he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light; and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified. And then it must be considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists, viz. All which things are nothing else but the heart exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which, as I showed before, God necessarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves himself, and values the glory of his own nature.
It is a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it.
Giving notice to end a tenancy
The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God; by which also God is magnified and exalted. So that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fullness which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God; and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conformed to God, and untied to him: and that in proportion as the communication is greater or less.
And the communication itself is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation, and praise of God consists. And it is farther to be considered, that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself which he intended through all eternity.
And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly show HOW, in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end.
There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself through eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And it is to be considered, that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: for so much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close: and, at the same time, the creature becomes more and more conformed to God.
The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the increasing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitely strict and perfect nearness, conformity, and oneness.
For it will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son. They were respected as brought home to him, united with him, centering most perfectly, as it were swallowed up in him: so that his respect to them finally coincides, and becomes one and the same, with respect to himself.
What has been said shows, that as all things are from God, as their first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity which argues, that he who is their first cause is their last end.
Chapter I: Section IV Some objections considered, which may be made against the reasonableness of what has been said of God making himself his last end. It may be thought that this does not well consist with God, being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that, in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his being perfectly and infinitely happy in himself.
If it could be supposed that God needed anything; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world. But seeing that God is above all need, and all capacity of being made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end, or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works?
How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things, with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore cannot now possibly need, nor with any color of reason be supposed to seek! God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature; yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself, and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart.
For it is only the effect of his own work in and communications to the creature; in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fullness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness. God may delight, with true and great pleasure, in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness.
And this is so far from being an instance of his happiness not being in and from himself, that it is an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he does not delight in his own beauty; that he has not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection. So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own 18 holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but it is truly an instance of it.
It is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it. Nor do these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness.
For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. His rejoicing therein is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. And yet, in some sense, it can be truly said, that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he were less good: or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse his own fullness.
And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections, in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and cannot be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him. For these expressions plainly mean no more, than that God is absolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happiness originates from man.
From what has been said, it appears, that the pleasure God has in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to, than in receiving from, the creature. Surely, it is no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fullness. It is no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow. For though these communications of God — these exercises, operations, and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in — are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change.
They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness, certainty, and fullness, in every respect, as he does now. They were always equally present; as with him there is no variableness or succession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating the world; something that was agreeable to his inclination or will; let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will.
Now, if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then, in the accomplishment of it, he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world be truly a thing grateful to him as certainly it is, if it be truly his end, and truly the object of his will , then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in.
But then, according to the argument of the objection, how can he have anything future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally, and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in, or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself, as his own complete object of enjoyment. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.
Whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in itself, or for something else for which he wills it; and so is his further end. Otherwise we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to anything brought to pass in time; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence, to be truly voluntary.
And if there be any such thing at all, as what we mean by acts of will in God; then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the fulfillment of his will. To suppose that God has pleasure in things that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically; is to suppose that he exercises will about these things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.
It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his desires, aims, actions, and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires, actions, and pursuits, if he fails of his end. Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the first and the last, this shows him to be all in all.
He is all to himself. He goes not out of himself in what he seeks; but his desires and pursuits as they originate from, so they terminate in, himself; and he is dependent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations.
Against All Things Ending
But if not himself, but the creature, were his last end, then as he depends on his last end, he would be in some sort dependent on the creature.
Some may object, that to suppose God makes himself his highest and last end, is dishonorable to him; as it in effect supposes, that God does every thing from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean and sordid in the creature; unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible character, who should in every thing he did, be governed by selfish principles; should make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life.
How far then should we be from attributing any such thing to the Supreme Being, the blessed and only Potentate! Does it not become us to ascribe to him the most noble and generous dispositions, and qualities the most remote from every thing private, narrow, and sordid? Such an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. If by selfishness be meant, a disposition in any being to regard himself; this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest.
Among created beings one single person is inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest is of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system. Therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self, as if it were more than all, is exceeding vicious.
But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a disposition that does not agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in anyone to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity, than it is treating things according to their true value; prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in itself.
But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing, and less than nothing and vanity, in comparison of his; and God be omniscient and infallible, and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being; then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this — which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things, and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them — and that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.
In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be inconsistent with the public good; at least it may be so in the apprehension of that person. That which this person looks upon as his interest, may interfere with or oppose the general good.
Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public. But this cannot be with respect to the Supreme Being, the author and head of the whole system; on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole.
It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart, and vitals of the natural body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God, who is omniscient, should apprehend his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole. God seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, that it is a kind of regard to himself that inclines him to seek the good of his creature.
It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fullness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions, and communications of it.
Here, by the way, it may be properly considered, whether some writers are not chargeable with inconsistency in this respect. They speak against the doctrine of God making himself his own highest and last end, as though this were an ignoble selfishness — when indeed he only is fit to be made the highest end, by himself and all other beings; inasmuch as he is infinitely greater and more worthy than all others — yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate regard, they suppose, that they necessarily, at all times, seek their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most virtuous actions; and that this principle, regulated by wisdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and highest happiness, is the foundation of all virtue, and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.
To what has been supposed, that God makes himself his end — in seeking that his glory and excellent perfections should be known, esteemed, loved, and delighted in by his creatures — it may be objected, that this seems unworthy of God. It is considered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise.
How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e.
Against All Things Ending
This objection is specious. It has a show of argument; but it will appear to be nothing but a show, if we consider, 1. Whether it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself; and so to take pleasure in its existence. It seems not liable to any doubt, that there could be no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect.
Understanding and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest and most excellent kind of their exercise, is in some actual knowledge, and exercise of will. And, certainly, the most excellent actual knowledge and will that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God.
And the most true excellent knowledge of God, is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence; and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love, and a delight in his glory. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. To make this plain let it be considered, how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another.
If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the being who has them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionally approved and regarded. I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem, and honor of himself.
The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us to approve of and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. Linden is recalled from her catatonic state by Covenant, but her yearning for his love is from her point of view spurned.
She grows bitter towards him as a result, and refocuses herself on the plight of her son. After a failed attempt by Linden to free Jeremiah from the croyel — during which the flames of Earthpower which she draws from the staff are tainted black, apparently permanently — the group are attacked by caesures, brought on by Joan's awareness of Linden's attempted use of wild magic.
No fewer than six caesures assail the company, and in the chaos Anele touches the dirt and is possessed by Kastenessen; the mad Elohim immediately kills Liand in an effort to protect the croyel. After Linden quenches the caesures, the Giants and Stave construct a rocky cairn for the slain Stonedownor, whose lover Pahni is inconsolable. The devastated group is soon attacked again by Roger and an army of Cavewights. During the battle, Galt sacrifices himself to protect Anele, indicating an alteration in the Humbled's stance towards the menace of his Earthpower.
Anele then uses Liand's orcrest and sacrifices his life to both slay the croyel, and to transfer his innate Earthpower, and heritage as the "Last hope of the Land" into Jeremiah. Infuriated by the loss of Anele and Galt, and exalted by the rescue of her son, Linden wields the white gold and utterly routs Roger and his Cavewights. In the battle's aftermath, it is revealed that Jeremiah remains locked in his isolated mental state, and that Galt was actually Stave's son, though the two had become estranged by Stave's repudiation of the Masters.
As for Esmer, the tormented half-Haruchai begs Linden for the release of death, but she cannot bring herself to do it, even though the required weapon, the krill, is at hand. Stave sees this and kills Esmer as an act of mercy — upon both Esmer and Linden, so that she would not have to.
The Demondim-spawn then depart. Abruptly, Covenant leaves with the two remaining Humbled to confront Joan. Linden and her companions follow the Ranyhyn, trusting the wise horses to know best what they must do next to confront the Land's doom. They lead Linden to a quarry of bones named Muirwin Delenoth. The bones belonged to quellvisks, an extinct race of monsters that Lord Foul created in an attempt to rouse the Worm by attacking the Elohim this plot failed, and the quellvisks were eradicated by the Elohim.
Unprompted, Jeremiah begins building a construct with the quellvisk bones, somehow using the ancient lost craft of anundivian yajna. The group are promptly targets of more than one foe: Joan, who begins assailing them with caesures; and Infelice, who appears and attempts to stop Jeremiah.
She hints that Jeremiah's construct will capture the Elohim, which she cannot permit. She describes his actions as "ruin incarnate". She also warns that Lord Foul's "deeper purpose" which he hinted at when Linden was summoned in The Runes of the Earth is to use Jeremiah's power, after the fall of the Arch of Time, to create a prison for the Creator, allowing Foul to rule all universes.
This, at last, is what has long been hinted at in references to "the shadow on the heart" of the Elohim: Infelice insists that Jeremiah's building must not be completed. In exchange for Linden stopping Jeremiah, Infelice offers a promise of the Elohim's protection for the boy, to ensure he does not fall back into the Despiser's hands. Linden refuses the bargain, and as a caesure attacks, Infelice binds Linden and Stave with enchantment, and moves to attack Jeremiah.
However, Stave and Linden resist, and with the assistance of the Ranyhyn, Linden is able to throw Jeremiah's old toy race car that Esmer had previously repaired to her son, who uses it to complete his construct. Infelice vanishes, and it is revealed that the construct is a doorway into Jeremiah's mind enabling him to escape the prison of his mind and finally gain cognizance.
At last he and his mother share an embrace, and Linden is able to believe "that her rent heart might heal". He refuses to ride a Ranyhyn in accordance with his ancient bargain with them, so the Humbled's Ranyhyn bring with them the steed formerly ridden by the Harrow, which they compel to bear Covenant. On the journey he speaks to the Feroce, diminutive creatures who worship the Lurker of the Sarangrave. They are offshoots of the same race that produced the skest and the sur-jheherrin.
The Feroce tell Covenant that the Lurker wants to be allied with Covenant, since it has realised the peril of the Worm as a common enemy. Covenant accepts this alliance, and the Feroce later help him when they battle with the skest. Covenant reaches Joan by entering a caesure; Branl and Clyme follow him with Haruchai loyalty, though Covenant is able to free only himself from the warped instant of time.
He realises that Joan is beyond reach as she rebukes his efforts to help her, and intends to kill him. Covenant calls the Ranyhyn, who are able to distract Joan — due to her love of horses.
The distraction provides him the opportunity to drive the krill through Joan's heart, ending the caesure and freeing the Humbled. Covenant and the Humbled climb onto the shore to evade a tidal wave caused by the Worm's approach to the Land; they survive, though the Humbled's Ranyhyn mounts are lost.
The morning sun has failed to dawn, and Thomas Covenant watches as the stars begin to wink out, one by one.Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.
In order to be determined what was designed, in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe we behold, it becomes us to attend to, and rely on, what HE has told us, who was the architect. To suppose that God has pleasure in things that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically; is to suppose that he exercises will about these things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.
For if they are, it will be just the same, as to the above purpose, as if they were not. If only that were the end of the story—a perfect world, with perfect people, existing forever. And 2. And the tillage of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced; and the crop produced is an end sought only for the sake of making bread; and bread is sought for the sake of gratifying the appetite.
Myself and everybody else. This page was last edited on 26 June , at
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